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The troika should recognise the efforts made by Portugal to
rebalance its finances and adjust the country’s bailout
conditions.
by Blog Admin
In May 2011 Portugal negotiated an IMF-EU bailout package of 78 billion euros, designed to
help the country stabilise its finances. In return Portugal agreed to implement a number of
reforms, with a target to reduce its budget deficit to 2.5 per cent by 2014. Paulo Trigo
Pereira assesses the country’s progress over the last two years, and suggests some new
measures to aid the recovery. He argues that the troika should consider decreasing the
interest rates and extending maturity dates on its loans to Portugal.
The idea that any country can change its economic structure, its budgetary f ramework, its
budgetary culture, and its institutions within the short period of  an adjustment programme (typically three or
f our years) is simply unrealistic. It is not possible to correct the errors of  past decades in a couple of  years
and this will not happen. The right perspective to look at a bailout adjustment programme is that it is the
beginning of  a ten year process of  ref orm, which includes f iscal consolidation, economic structural ref orm
and institutional ref orm (including constitutional) in order to guarantee the long term sustainability of  public
f inances. However, it is necessary to combine economic and institutional ref orm with democratic legit imacy.
This needs consensus building across polit ical parties. One lesson of  the Italian election is that it is not
enough to do the right things: it is essential that cit izens also understand them and start seeing some light
at the end of  the tunnel.
Nearly two years on f rom its bailout, and in the week that the EU’s f inance ministers gathered to discuss it,
now is an apt t ime to take stock of  Portugal’s adjustment programme and the progress that has been made
in the country, while also addressing what may be unrealistic projections f or the f uture. There is a need to
revise the adjustment programme and clarif y the role of  the European Central Bank (ECB) in the short term,
although in the medium term this will not be enough. Portugal also needs domestic changes, as well as a
stronger, more f ederal European Polit ical Union, with economic governance, and a Treasury and budget
directed towards the people who are suf f ering f rom adjustment policies.
Some key facts about Portugal
Portugal has never had a f iscal surplus since its transit ion to democracy in 1974, which is quite unique
among European countries. This simple f act shows that, until quite recently, there has been a polit ical
culture which dictated that def icits do not matter. In February 2013, the Portuguese Parliament approved
changes in the Budget Framework Law (BFL) in order to introduce the provisions of  the “Fiscal Compact”.
However, the BFL is not a Law requiring a supermajority to be changed, so it is not as stable as it should be.
In May 2011 the then socialist
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In May 2011 the then socialist
government approved a bailout
programme of  €78 billion (of  which €12
billion was f or bank recapitalisation)
with the acquiescence of  opposition
right wing parties. In June, elections
put the socialists out of  power and a
new government was elected.
Theref ore, we have now had 21
months of  the bailout adjustment
programme and we can look at some
data.
The current sixth revision of  the
programme establishes a
consolidation path of  reducing the
public def icit f rom 9.8 per cent of  GDP
in 2010, to 5.9 per cent in 2011, 5 per
cent in 2012, 4.5 per cent in 2013, and 2.5 per cent in 2014. The target f or 2011 was achieved (a def icit of
4.4 per cent) through extraordinary revenues. The target f or 2012 may not be reached, even with
extraordinary revenue (accounting f or 0.5 per cent of  GDP) that the government has considered, but
EUROSTAT may not accept to register (the privatisation of  ANA, Aeroportos de Portugal). Missing the
f iscal target in 2012 is down to an over-evaluation of  f iscal revenues, particularly VAT. All major f iscal
revenues were below the budget estimates and the deviation was around €3 billion, or 1.8 per cent of  GDP.
This was a result, on the one hand, of  a higher than expected contraction of  consumption and imports, and
on the other hand of  gross miscalculations within the Ministry of  Finance.
As expected, a pro-cyclical f iscal policy had a negative ef f ect on economic growth and employment. The
real variation of  GDP was a f all of  1.6 per cent in 2011, and a f all of  3.2 per cent in 2012. Austerity
measures lead to a collapse in domestic demand, which was compensated f or by posit ive developments in
net external demand in the last quarter of  2011 and half  of  2012. Unemployment has been rising f rom 12.9
per cent in 2010 to an expected 17.6 per cent, particularly among younger cit izens, and public debt has
reached 120 per cent of  GDP.
The main posit ive short term economic consequences of  the adjustment programme are twof old. The
current account balance which was highly in def icit in the past is now almost balanced (-0.2 per cent of  GDP
in 2012). Also, the public corporations, which are considered within general government, are improving their
economic results. Finally, at the start of  this year Portugal went to the capital markets to borrow €2.5 billion
with a medium term maturity (5 years) f or the f irst t ime since the beginning of  the adjustment programme.
This was a relative success. Some credit must be given to the government’s strong commitment to f iscal
consolidation, but a considerable part of  the credit should also be attributed to the President of  the ECB,
Mario Draghi .
What lies ahead?
What lies ahead depends as much on Portugal as it depends on the evolution of  the European Economy
and the actions of  the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF (the troika). But one thing is sure, the
period 2013-2016 will not be easy, and Europe and Portugal are still some distance away f rom overcoming
the current crisis. Last autumn the government and the troika f orecasted a recession of  1 per cent f or
2013. At the same time a panel of  independent economists predicted a recession no smaller than 2 per
cent.
The Bank of  Portugal has since revised its growth f orecasts down (now to a f all of  1.9 per cent) and in
February 2013 the Portuguese government and the European Commission endorsed this f orecast. The
continuation of  the recession into 2013 has been caused by a combination of  : i) the recession in other
Eurozone countries, which are the main export markets of  Portugal; ii) relatively adverse f inancial
conditions (the Portuguese Government borrowed €1.155 billion f or 12 months at 1.27 per cent, while
Germany on the same day (20/02/13) borrowed at 1.66 per cent f or 10 year bonds); iii) relative high taxes
when compared with Eastern European countries; and iv) the continuation of  pro-cyclical and unstable
f iscal policies.
Portugal has to do its part by f ollowing a consolidation path and taking measures to promote growth and
employment. One example of  the wrong type of  measure is the application of  the top VAT rate to
restaurants, which led to small restaurants f acing bankruptcy, decreased employment and in all likelihood a
f all in VAT revenues. On the other hand the renegotiation of  public-private partnership (PPPs), which the
government has started, but without much success, should be a priority. Over this period, Portugal will have
its peak expenditures on PPPs (€1.5 billion in 2014), which will surpass 1 billion euros per annum until 2019.
The “troika” also has to help, particularly by extending the maturit ies of  loans and decreasing interest rates.
Figure 1 illustrates the huge borrowing requirements of  Portugal in the f orthcoming years (€48.8 billion in
three years – 2014-16 – excluding the rollover of  European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) f unds in 2015).
An extension of  maturit ies of  long term debt is essential and a decreasing of  interest rates and
commissions also seems urgent.  This week (5th March) the ECOFIN Ministers “discussed whether EU
Finance Ministers would be ready in principle to consider an adjustment of  the maturit ies on the EFSF and
EFSM loans to Ireland and Portugal in order to smooth the debt redemption prof iles of  both countries.” The
f iscal target f or 2014 and 2015 should also be somewhat relaxed. It is simply not possible to get a 2.5 per
cent def icit in 2014 without a deep recessive impact. Even a 3 per cent target will be dif f icult to achieve. 
Figure 1: Portugal’s Medium and Long Term Debt
Source: IGCP- Portuguese Treasury and Debt Management Agency
A recent study f rom a large private bank (BPI) has indicated that the EFSF is borrowing at an average rate
of  1.5 per cent and charging Portugal 3 per cent. This means that there is some room f or maneuver to
decrease interest rates of  the EFSF and EFSM to say 1.9 per cent or 2 per cent. This would be much more
benef icial than an extension of  maturit ies (and should complement that measure). Unless there is some
decrease in interest rates, or the restrictive f iscal policy, the situation will continue to depress domestic
demand, aggravating recession and promoting social unrest. The austerity measures adopted in 2012, and
the large increase in taxes in 2013, are eroding social support f or the adjustment programme.
It is likely that the EU Finance Ministers and the troika will agree on extending maturit ies an extra year f or
the excessive def icit to be corrected. But this will not be enough. If  debt interest rates do not go down, the
amount of  expenditure cuts will be of  suf f icient magnitude to depress the economy even f urther.
Theref ore, in order to f acilitate access to capital markets, and decrease interest rates, the ECB should
clarif y the conditions under which it will launch the Outright Monetary Transactions in countries like Ireland
and Portugal.
Large demonstrations in 18 cit ies (about half  a million in Lisbon) on March 2nd illustrate that Europe and the
troika should recognise the ef f orts that are being made by Portuguese cit izens, and should acknowledge
that they have made overly optimistic f orecasts on the def icit, debt, growth, and employment. The ef f ects
of  austerity are much larger than those anticipated by the troika. On the other hand, the Portuguese
government should be much more innovative and creative in measures that promote employment, exports
and economic growth. Unless suf f icient measures are put in place at the European and domestic levels,
Portugal will see a progressive decline of  its economic base and will not be capable of  regaining economic
growth, employment creation and f ull access to capital markets.
These are the “small things” that have to be done in the short term. In the medium and long term either
Europe progresses decidedly towards f urther polit ical integration with the countries that want to move
f orward, and based on a common sense of  solidarity among the peoples of  Europe, or the euro, as it
exists today, will collapse. The European Commission cannot be seen to be the ‘bad guys’ who, with the IMF
and ECB, implement austerity measures that lead to unemployment and poverty f or hundreds of  thousands
of  cit izens in peripheral countries, and keep youth unemployment high. It also must show, not in words but
in practical terms, the meaning of  solidarity: or what Adam Smith called “sympathy”. This can be done with
economic governance, with a Treasury, and a budget that assumes, at a Union level, some of  the
redistribution allowances of  the Member States, targeted to youth employment and elderly poverty, and not
just to f armers.
If  Europe shows its human f ace, and makes progress towards ref orming the treaties, it may win the
support of  European cit izens and have democratic legit imacy f or f urther polit ical integration. If  not, it will be
impossible to sustain f ragile coalit ions that still support austerity measures in peripheral countries. We are
still f ar away f rom solving the euro crisis, but this is a complementary story…
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Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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